Indiana Law Journal
Volume 91

Issue 3

Article 9

Spring 2016

The Right to Attention
Jasper L. Tran
George Mason University, tran4lr@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Human Rights Law
Commons, Internet Law Commons, Marketing Law Commons, Natural Law Commons, and the Privacy
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tran, Jasper L. (2016) "The Right to Attention," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 91 : Iss. 3 , Article 9.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol91/iss3/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The Right to Attention
JASPER L. TRAN*
“In the future, our attention will be sold.”1

What marketing, contracts, and healthcare—specifically informed consent and
mandatory ultrasounds—have in common is the right to attention from the
information receiver. However, scholarship most often focuses on the
communicator’s perspective (e.g., how much information the communicator
discloses) or on the information itself, but surprisingly, not much on the receiver’s
perspective.
This dearth of scholarship from the information receiver’s perspective is
problematic, because the information receiver is often the “little guy” in the
conversation. We own and are entitled to our attention because attention is a
property right and part of our individual dignity. Yet advertisement companies and
scam artists freely bombard us with their “products” daily, resulting in our own time
and monetary loss. Without recognizing the right to attention, contract formation
and informed consent (just to name a few) are hollow and superfluous: contracting
parties have no meeting of the minds, and informed consent is giving consent without
being informed. States could continue to freely mandate ultrasounds for pregnant
women against their wills as though their attentions were not really theirs in the first
place. Similarly, other problems in our daily lives that involve attention would likely
continue to go unaddressed. New emerging technologies make this an issue of
increasing importance.
This Article proposes legislation to recognize the right to attention as a statutory
right, or alternatively, suggests that the courts recognize the right to attention as a
common-law right based on the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the right to
attention’s much larger, as-yet-poorly-defined bundle of rights includes, for
example, the right to deny attention when demanded, the right to be left alone, the
right to not be spammed and the right to not receive ads when such advertisement is
unwanted or uninvited, the right to waive the understanding of an agreement, the
right to give consent without being informed, and the right to not be required to
receive information against one’s will.
This Article is the first to identify the right to attention, including its much larger,
as-yet-poorly-defined bundle of rights. This Article hopes to identify and illuminate
the right to attention in hopes of generating further discussion and exploration of
this novel bundle of rights.

† Copyright © 2016 Jasper L. Tran.
* Humphrey Policy Fellow, Google Policy Fellow. I am grateful to June Carbone for
helping me develop this topic. Sincere thanks to Lawrence Solum, Eric Goldman, Galen
Williams and Mai Moua for their helpful feedback. All views are mine alone, not my
employer’s, sponsor’s or other affiliations’. Contact me at tran4lr@gmail.com.
1. Mark Manson, In the Future, Our Attention Will Be Sold, MARK MANSON (Dec. 4,
2014), http://markmanson.net/attention [https://perma.cc/6THB-CRSE].
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine how you would feel if you were on a dinner date (things are going
smoothly) then, all of a sudden, a Mariachi group stops by your table and plays their
music for the next five minutes, interrupting your conversation and the enjoyment of
your meal.2 That same feeling occurs when you are watching TV and a series of
advertisements comes up; or when you are browsing the Internet and a series of
pop-up ads appears; or when you are checking your e-mails, only to find out that
more than half of your e-mails are spam ads; or worst of all, when you are using an
iPhone app and an ad pops up demanding you to either pay for an ad-free version or
have to watch the ads to continue using the app. We all feel bothered by unwanted
and unwelcomed instruction of our attention, yet this occurs daily.
In Stuart v. Camnitz,3 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit invalidated a
provision of North Carolina’s new law4 requiring physicians to perform an ultrasound,
display the sonogram, and describe the fetus to women seeking abortions, “even if the
woman actively ‘avert[s] her eyes’ and ‘refus[es] to hear.’”5 Interestingly, the Fourth
Circuit found this provision unconstitutional because it violated physicians’ free speech
rights,6 but not because it violated the rights of the women subjected to mandatory
ultrasounds against their will. Ironically, this new law is titled, “Woman’s Right to Know
Act.”7 Rather than focusing on patient attention, North Carolina’s new law for mandatory
videos or other forms of delivering information impermissibly compelled patients’
attention and distorted the information.8 This is neither the first time nor the only time9

2. Assuming you did not expect or welcome the Mariachi group’s presence.
3. 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015). Similar types of
cases with an implied issue dealing with the right to attention will be likely to come up before
the Supreme Court again soon. See infra Part II.
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85(b) (West Supp. 2014) (“display of real-time view
requirement”), invalidated by Stuart, 774 F.3d 238.
5. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 242 (alterations in original) (quoting § 90-21.85(b)).
6. Id.
7. §§ 90-21.80 to -21.92 (West Supp. 2014).
8. See infra Part I.C.2.
9. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (addressing
Pennsylvania law that, among other things: (1) required doctors to inform women about
detriments to health in abortion procedures, (2) required women to give prior notice to their
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that states have freely mandated pregnant women’s attention against their will—here,
mandatory ultrasounds—but the women’s attention does not belong to the states.10
Without recognizing the right to attention, contract formation and informed
consent, just to name a few, are hollow and superfluous11: contracting parties have
no meeting of the minds,12 and informed consent is giving consent without being
informed.13 States could continue to freely mandate ultrasounds for pregnant women
against their will as though their attention were not really theirs in the first place.
Similarly, other problems in our daily lives that involve attention, for example,
contract formation and informed consent, would likely continue to go unaddressed.
New emerging technologies make this an issue of increasing importance.14
In 1890, U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Louis D. Brandeis and his former
classmate Samuel D. Warren published an article titled “The Right to Privacy” in the
Harvard Law Review’s fourth volume.15 Little did they know that, 125 years later,
their article would give rise to and shape a substantial body of constitutional law that
inspired many civil rights movements and gave rise to many of the constitutional
rights each individual has today.16 That article also inspired the writing of this
Article, which celebrates the 125th anniversary17 of Brandeis’s and Warren’s article.

husbands, (3) required minors to receive consent from a parent or guardian prior to an abortion,
and (4) imposed a twenty-four-hour hold before obtaining an abortion).
10. See infra Part I.C.2. Note that pregnant women could bring their problems to courts,
but without the recognition of the right to attention, courts seem to struggle in addressing their
concerns. See, e.g., Stuart, 774 F.3d 238 (invalidating North Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound
law as unconstitutional because it violated physicians’ free speech rights).
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See infra Part II.C.2.
13. See infra Part II.C.1.
14. See infra Part II.A.2.
15. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
16. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that Texas violated the liberty
of two gay men when it enforced against them a state law prohibiting homosexual sodomy);
Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing that individuals have a liberty
interest that includes the right to make decisions to terminate life-prolonging medical treatments);
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (finding privacy protection for an extended
family’s choice of living arrangements, and striking down a housing ordinance that prohibited a
grandmother from living together with her two grandsons); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238
(1976) (upholding a grooming regulation for police officers, and illustrating the trend toward
limiting the scope of the “zone of privacy”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the
right of privacy to include a woman’s right to have an abortion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (unanimously concluding that the right of privacy protected an individual’s right to possess
and view pornography in his own home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking
down a state law prohibiting the possession, sale, and distribution of contraceptives to married
couples); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (applying Meyer’s principles to strike
down an Oregon law that compelled all children to attend public schools, a law that would have
effectively closed all parochial schools in the state); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(striking down a state law that prohibited the teaching of German and other foreign languages to
children until the ninth grade); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (finding constitutional
protection for the right of a citizen to possess and use small quantities of marijuana in his own home).
17. Coincidentally, 2015 also marks the 800th birthday of Magna Carta, one of the
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What marketing18 and mandatory ultrasounds19—in addition to contract
formation20 and informed consent21—have in common is the information receiver’s
right22 to attention. Attention, by definition, is “the concentration of awareness on
some phenomenon to the exclusion of other stimuli.”23 It seems so easy to disregard
attention as something trivial. Things remain small when there is no discussion of
them, but once we talk about them, they become big deals. Many things happen this
way; for example, the current movements of feminism24 and #BlackLivesMatter25 all
started like this, that is, with attention redirected to something that had previously
been neglected.26
Every exchange of information involves at least two parties, where one side
communicates the information and the other side receives the information. Legal
scholarship most often focuses on the communicator’s perspective (e.g., how much
information the communicator discloses) or on the information itself,27 but

world’s great symbols of rights and the rule of law.
18. See infra Part I.C.1.
19. See infra Part I.C.2.
20. See infra Part II.C.2.
21. See infra Part II.C.1.
22. This Article does not get into the debate between rights and freedoms. Compare, e.g.,
RICHARD MCKEON, ROBERT K. MERTON & WALTER GELLHORN, THE FREEDOM TO READ:
PERSPECTIVE AND PROGRAM (1957) (discussing the freedom to read), with Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 15 (discussing the right to privacy). Nonetheless, the right to attention belongs in
the “right” category.
23. 1 THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA: MICROPÆDIA 685 (15th ed. 2005)
[hereinafter MICROPÆDIA] (describing early psychologists’ definition of “attention”). For a
discussion on the competing definitions of attention, see infra Part I.A.
24. See generally MARY E. HAWKESWORTH, GLOBALIZATION AND FEMINIST ACTIVISM
(2006).
25. See generally About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVES MATTER,
http://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/X989-88NZ]. The #BlackLivesMatter
movement is a recent example of the race-color distinction as evidence of discussion of
previously infrequently discussed issues. “Distinguishing color—light, black, in between—as
the marker for race is really an error: It’s socially constructed, it’s culturally enforced and it
has some advantages for certain people,” Toni Morrison says. “I Regret Everything”: Toni
Morrison Looks Back on Her Personal Life, NPR (Apr. 22, 2015, 12:15 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2015/04/20/400394947/i-regret-everything-toni-morrison-looks-back-on
-her-personal-life [https://perma.cc/26AM-AP2B]. “But this is really skin privilege—the
ranking of color in terms of its closeness to white people or white-skinned people and its
devaluation according to how dark one is and the impact that has on people who are dedicated
to the privileges of certain levels of skin color.” Id.
26. The pervasive racism and lack of women’s rights were unnoticed in the past, but in
recent years, the movements have gained much momentum in the media, and people are taking
notice.
27. There is, however, some research on the effectiveness of the information in reaching
the recipient in the advertisement literature. See, e.g., ALBERT A. REED, KATE E. GRISWOLD,
GEORGE FRENCH, JAMES BARRETT KIRK & LEROY FAIRMAN, ADVERTISING AND SELLING,
VOLUME 24 (2011) (discussing attention, in terms of the timing to reach the recipient, in the
context of advertisement). Also, attention’s effectiveness has been researched in the context
of eyewitness testimony’s reliability. See, e.g., Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on
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surprisingly, not much on the receiver’s perspective. This lack of discussion and
dearth of scholarship from the receiver’s perspective is problematic, because the
information receiver is often the “little guy” in the conversation. We own and are
entitled to our attention because attention is a property right and part of our individual
dignity.28 Yet advertisement companies and scam artists freely bombard us with their
“products” daily, resulting in our own time and monetary loss.29 For example, “we’ve
gone from being exposed to about 500 ads a day back in the 1970’s to as many as
5,000 a day [in 2006],”30 and that number is still climbing. Of course, the degree of
intrusiveness of advertisements and spam varies depending on their platform,
whereas the more time consumed (or the more money lost), the higher the
intrusiveness and vice versa.31 Furthermore, giving up the right to attention cannot
be a condition of, for example, forming a contract.32
This Article proposes legislation to recognize the right to attention as a
statutory right or, alternatively, suggests that the courts recognize the right to
attention as a constitutional right. Specifically, the right to attention’s much
larger, as-yet-poorly-defined bundle of rights includes, for example, the right to deny
attention when demanded, the right to be left alone, the right not to be spammed and
the right not to receive ads when such advertisement is unwanted or uninvited, the
right to waive the understanding of an agreement, the right to give consent without
being informed, and the right not to be required to receive information against one’s
will.33
The right to attention could be in the form of: (1) a constitutional right, (2) a
statutory right, (3) an economics/property right, or (4) a human right.34 It would
primarily be a negative right rather than a positive right.35 To infringe on an
individual’s right to attention, the government would probably be subject to some
level of intermediate-scrutiny review, rather than rational basis or strict scrutiny.

Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013,
1018–19 (1995) (discussing that violent events reduce the ability to focus attention, which
makes recall of the details of an attack difficult); Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler,
Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Jury Decisionmaking, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43
(1989). However, there is not much legal scholarship on the information receiver’s side.
28. See infra Part II.A.1.
29. See infra Part I.C.1. Consumers make significant expenditures to stop the
bombardment. See, e.g., Justin M. Rao & David H. Reiley, The Economics of Spam, J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 2012, at 87, 100 (estimating the annual costs of spam to consumers at nearly
$14 billion and estimating firm spending on antispam solutions at $6.5 billion (citing Richi
Jennings, Cost of Spam is Flattening—Our 2009 Predictions, MUSEUM EMAIL & DIGITAL
COMM. (Jan. 28, 2009), http://email-museum.com/2009/01/28/cost-of-spam-is-flattening-our
-2009-predictions/ [https://perma.cc/QF37-RYGW])).
30. Caitlin Johnson, Cutting Through Advertising Clutter, CBS NEWS (Sept. 17, 2006,
8:34 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/17/sunday/main2015684.shtml
[https://perma.cc/WX8M-WZWY].
31. See infra Part I.C.1.
32. See infra Part II.A.2.
33. See infra Part II.A.2 & notes 213–219.
34. See infra Part II.A.3.
35. See infra Part II.A.2 & note 220.
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The right to attention generally would not arise if an individual were under an
obligation36 or were to gain a privilege.37 Although it is hard to tell whether an
individual is paying attention, his or her attention can be demanded through, for
example, the administration of an exam.38 Even so, the demanding party would still
need a legitimate interest to override an individual’s right to attention and require his
or her attention for a finite amount of time.39 Another exception to the right to
attention is that there is no right to attention in a human relationship, for example, in
a domestic dispute.40
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I defines “attention” and analyzes its value
as a currency along with money and time. Part I then discusses the problems in
marketing and mandatory ultrasounds when there is no right to attention. Part II
explores the justifications for the right to attention and when the right to attention
does and does not arise. Part II further applies the right to attention to contract
formation and informed consent, and rebuts common criticisms.
I. ATTENTION AND ITS VALUE
A. Defining “Attention”
The plain meaning of attention is “the act or state of attending esp. through
applying the mind to an object of sense or thought; a condition of readiness for such
attention involving esp. a selective narrowing or focusing of consciousness and
receptivity.”41 Psychologists define attention as “the concentration of awareness on
some phenomenon to the exclusion of other stimuli.”42 Economists43 define attention
as “focused mental engagement on a particular item of information.”44 Given the lack
of dispute in what attention means, this Article adopts psychologists’ attention
definition—“the concentration of awareness on some phenomenon to the exclusion
of other stimuli.”45
Some claim to have an ability to multitask (i.e., splitting their attention to perform
multiple tasks at once).46 Others are cynical of this ability, and claim attention cannot

36. North Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound requirement is not an obligation to pregnant
women because the new law interferes with the pregnant woman’s right to abort. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
37. The quid pro quo for demanding an individual’s attention would be to give him or her
a privilege in exchange.
38. Assuming he or she wants to pass, of course. Without paying attention, one would not
likely pass an exam.
39. See infra Part II.A.3.
40. This human relationship is a personal relationship rather than a commercial one like
in the case of advertisement, spam, and scams. See infra Part I.C.1.
41. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 79 (11th ed. 2003).
42. MICROPÆDIA, supra note 23, at 685.
43. The economists mentioned here are ones who study “attention economics.” For a
discussion on attention economics, see generally infra note 86.
44. THOMAS H. DAVENPORT & JOHN C. BECK, THE ATTENTION ECONOMY:
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW CURRENCY OF BUSINESS 20 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
45. MICROPÆDIA, supra note 23, at 685.
46. E.g., William H. Gladstones, Michael A. Regan & Robert B. Lee, Division of
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be divided.47 To simplify the matter, this Article proceeds by only addressing an
individual’s undivided attention. In short, having an individual’s attention means
having his or her (full) focus.
Humans can detect whether someone they are talking to is paying attention to
them. It is not hard to tell whether an individual is paying attention in a conversation,
either in person or over the phone/FaceTime/Skype. In other words, people value one
another’s attention. But how is attention’s value measured?
B. Attention’s Value
“[A]ttention is what creates value.”48
The most desired gift of love is not diamonds or roses or chocolate. It is
focused attention. . . . Attention says, “I value you enough to give you
my most precious asset—my time.” Whenever you give your time, you
are making a sacrifice, and sacrifice is the essence of love.49
Viewing attention as an asset is not new—scholars have already studied attention
for almost a century now.50 In brief, attention has value,51 and its value is increasing
as the demands for our attention are increasing.52

Attention: The Single-Channel Hypothesis Revisited, 41 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 2
(1989).
47. Multitasking would likely decrease productivity and performance quality. See, e.g.,
id.; Harold Pashler, Dual-Task Interference in Simple Tasks: Data and Theory, 116 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 220 (1994).
48. DAVID HOULE & JONATHAN FLEECE, THE NEW HEALTH AGE: THE FUTURE OF HEALTH
CARE IN AMERICA ____ (2011).
49. RICK WARREN, THE PURPOSE DRIVEN LIFE 127 (2002).
50. In the past, Karl Marx studied labor certificates, which arguably were a form of
spending attention for money. See, e.g., KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 8
(C. P. Dutt ed., Int’l Publishers Co. 1938) (1875) (discussing labor certificates—as a form of
spending attention for money—as a “certificate from society that [the laborer] has furnished
such and such an amount of labour,” which “draws from the social stock of means of
consumption as much as the same amount of labour costs”). In modern time, the entire
marketing and advertisement industry is based on how much its ads can grab and retain the
viewers’ attention. See Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
1151, 1194–97 (discussing attention markets as marketplace alternatives to regulation); see
also Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014) (discussing
the realities of a marketplace as mediated by technology and how digital market manipulation
reveals the limits of consumer protection law and exposes economic and privacy harms).
51. See infra Parts I.B.1–.3.
52. See infra Part I.B.4.
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1. Attention as Currency
Nowadays, people associate currency with money.53 In fact, the definition of
“currency” contains the word “money.”54 Money generally takes the form of bills,
coins, and checks or credits through a financial institution (i.e., a bank). Starting in
2008, money can take a new form, called “Bitcoin,” as a digital currency.55
In the early nineteenth century, people attempted to use time as currency through
the form of labor.56 Lately, the concept of time-based currency is making a comeback.57
Indeed, people can theoretically spend time and money interchangeably: people
exchange their time for money and money for others’ time.
Besides money and time, a third form of currency is attention.58 In fact, the word
“attention” is used in conjunction with the word “pay” in the phrase “to pay attention,”
signaling its value as a currency. Like time, attention is scarce. Scholars are discussing
that our attention span is getting shorter and shorter in the information age59 and even
speculate that, in the future, our attention will be sold.60 In fact, we can spend attention
like time61 or money62 interchangeably.

53. E.g., CTR. FOR FIN. TRAINING, BANKING SYSTEMS 38 (2d ed. 2010) (“Most people
associate the word [“currency”] with paper money . . . .”).
54. See, e.g., Currency, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse
/currency?s=t [https://perma.cc/KMF9-JZH9] (defining “currency” as “something that is used
as a medium of exchange; money”).
55. See generally SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH
SYSTEM (2008), available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS78-2YJD]
(identifying bitcoin as “[a] purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash [that] would allow
online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial
institution”).
56. See MARX, supra note 50, at 8 (discussing labor certificates as a “certificate from
society that [the laborer] has furnished such and such an amount of labour,” which “draws
from the social stock of means of consumption as much as the same amount of labour costs”);
JOSIAH WARREN, TRUE CIVILIZATION: AN IMMEDIATE NECESSITY AND THE LAST GROUND OF
HOPE FOR MANKIND 184 (Boston, J. Warren 1863) (discussing that, in 1827, Josiah Warren
established the Cincinnati Time Store where people could purchase goods with labor notes
representing an agreement to perform labor); JONATHAN R. ZATLIN, THE CURRENCY OF
SOCIALISM 24–25 (2007) (discussing that Robert Owen established marketplaces and banks
that accepted labor notes in London in 1832, but his efforts failed in 1834).
57. See, e.g., IN TIME (Regency Enterprises 2011) (fictional movie where time has become
a universal currency that can be used to pay for day-to-day expenses and can be transferred
between people or capsules).
58. See James G. Webster, User Information Regimes: How Social Media Shape Patterns
of Consumption, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 593, 594 (2010) (“In this world, attracting and managing
attention is a prerequisite for achieving almost any economic, political, or cultural objective.
Attention might thus be thought of as the currency of a new economy.”).
59. See, e.g., RICHARD A. LANHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF ATTENTION, at xi–41 (2006)
(arguing that our attention has decreased in the information age and discussing attention economics).
60. E.g., Michael H. Goldhaber, Attention Shoppers!, WIRED (Dec. 1, 1997, 12:00 PM),
http://www.wired.com/1997/12/es-attention/ [https://perma.cc/5FDE-ZNS4]; Manson, supra note 1.
61. See infra Part I.B.2.
62. See infra Part I.B.3.
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2. Attention vs. Time
“A leader’s most precious resource is not their time. It’s their focused attention.
Time merely passes, while focused attention makes things happen.”63 An individual
with focused attention “can have a significant impact in a minimal amount of time.”64
Conversely, “all the time in the world is insufficient” for an individual without
attention.65
Both time and attention are scarce commodities. Worldwide, women have an
average life expectancy of 71 years, while men have an average life expectancy of
66.5 years,66 and there are only about 365 days per year and 24 hours per day. “No
matter how much money you have, you can’t buy more time. There are only 24 hours
in everyone’s day,” says Bill Gates.67 Like time, each individual only has a limited
amount of attention to “spend.”68
Some view time and attention interchangeably; others view attention as time’s
subcategory—attention’s outer limit is time.69 For example, when an attorney
charges her client for her time, that attorney supposedly pays attention to the
client.70 However, this is not necessarily true all the time. An individual can give
people the time of his or her day but, at the same time, not pay any attention to
what is going on.71 For employees in a factory, time equates to opportunity cost

63. Ed Batista, To Stay Focused, Manage Your Emotions, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Feb. 2,
2015), https://hbr.org/2015/02/to-stay-focused-manage-your-emotions [https://perma.cc
/X2CH-MTR6] (emphasis in original).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World Population Prospects: The
2012 Revision, Highlights and Advance Tables, 17, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP.228 (2013).
67. Bill Gates, Three Things I’ve Learned from Warren Buffett, LINKEDIN PULSE (June
12, 2013), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20130612065727-251749025-three-things-i-ve
-learned-from-warren-buffett [https://perma.cc/2R22-F2QX].
68. Thus, attention economics treats attention as a scarce commodity. See infra note 86
and accompanying text.
69. As such, they view attention as time’s subcategory by measuring attention under
time’s unit. See, e.g., Jason Fried, What’s the Difference Between Time and Attention? A Lot.,
OBSERVER (Dec. 9, 2015, 10:01 AM), http://observer.com/2015/12/whats-the-difference
-between-time-and-attention-a-lot/ [https://perma.cc/JER8-ZE5P] (“Attention is a far more
limited resource than time. . . . [For instance,] I may have 8 hours a day for work, but I probably
have 4 hours a day for attention.”).
70. Cf. Demetrios Dimitriou, The Individual Practitioner and Commercialism in the
Profession: How Can the Individual Survive?, 45 S.C. L. REV. 965, 973 (1994) (“The failure
to focus on the client, forgetting that the value of the services rendered is measured by the
client and not the lawyer, has resulted in clients’ perceiving lawyers as being interested only
in making money, not meeting client needs.”).
71. Some call this not “being [mentally] present” or “being in the presence.” The opposite
would be “being absent” despite one’s physical presence. See, e.g., Roger Fransecky, Are You
Really Paying Attention? The Importance of Being Present, HUFFPOST HEALTHY LIVING: THE
BLOG (Oct. 19, 2010, 8:27 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-fransecky/are-you
-really-paying-att_b_758025.html [https://perma.cc/3VSQ-4YPL].
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(i.e., the inability to be doing something else).72 The employer thus pays for the
employee’s time even if the employee could just stand around waiting.73 The
Fordism/Taylorism literature from the 1920s focused on how to optimize use of
the employee’s time for the employer, largely through refinements of the assembly
line idea.74 The allocation, though, was clear: employers paid for time, and they
got to decide how to allocate the time they paid for. In some ways, routinization
makes the value of the employee’s time less dependent on the employee’s level of
attention (or skill).
With lawyers, on the other hand, time spent without attention is valueless; yet,
the attorney, not the client, controls the allocation of attention. This presents an
intrinsic conflict of interest. For example, when an attorney bills his or her client
for traveling time, that attorney could be spending his or her attention during this
time to read up on materials for another client—an ethical issue of double or
fraudulent billing.75 An attorney could also unethically bill for sleeping time,
where he or she was not paying attention to the client’s matter per se. Thus,
attention is arguably more valuable than time, even if time without attention is
part of the price of accomplishing a task—attention is an assumed feature of time
billed, at least for attorneys.
3. Attention vs. Money
“In the future, our attention will be sold.”76 Unsurprisingly, others can make
money using our attention. The marketing industry preys on our attention through
advertisement.77 Advertisement demands our attention through many shapes and
forms: newspaper ads, TV commercials, spam e-mails, spam phone calls, website
pop-up ads, in-person sales pitches, etc. YouTube video posters and bloggers make
money based on the number of views. Writers desire to formulate
“attention-grabbing” sentences. Statistically, “we’ve gone from being exposed to
about 500 ads a day back in the 1970’s to as many as 5,000 a day [in 2006],”78 and
that number is still climbing.
We can also save or make money by “spending” our attention. For example,
coupon clippers spend their time—and thus pay attention to—collecting coupons to

72. See, e.g., Emily Oster, Time Is Money: So How Much Is Yours Worth?, SLATE (Feb.
6, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/02/time_is_ money
_opportunity_cost_can_help_you_figure_out_how_much_your_time.html [https://perma.cc
/5VMX-YC2C].
73. See id.
74. See generally BERNARD DORAY, FROM TAYLORISM TO FORDISM: A RATIONAL
MADNESS (David Macey trans., Free Ass’n Books 1988) (1981).
75. See generally Kevin Hopkins, Law Firms, Technology, and the Double-Billing
Dilemma, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 102 & n.42 (1998).
76. Manson, supra note 1.
77. In fact, grabbing and keeping potential customers’ attention is the foundation of the
entire marketing industry. See e.g., CAROL MCCLELLAND, GREEN CAREERS FOR DUMMIES 184
(2010) (stating that marketing is about “[g]rabbing and keeping the customer’s attention”).
78. Johnson, supra note 30.
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save money.79 Furthermore, some mobile apps80 even pay users in-app rewards to
view thirty-second advertisements.81
Although attention’s value increases with increasing demands and inelastic
supply,82 the exact value for each individual’s attention might be difficult to quantify.
The value to an advertiser of the ability to command attention has a discoverable
price, but we lack an attention market83 that would reveal how much an individual is
willing to pay to be free from such intrusions. Fortunately, at least one thing is
certain: attention has value.
4. The Economics of Attention84
The term “attention” came to economists’ attention in the latter half of the
twentieth century,85 and the study of attention economics treats attention as a scarce
commodity to solve information-management problems.86 In fact, Nobel Laureate
Herbert Simon87 warned:

79. See Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of
Consumer Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 366 (2007) (defining consumer rebates and
coupons).
80. See generally Daniel Parisi, Recent Development, Mobile App Privacy: Developing
Standard and Effective Privacy Tools for Consumers, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 240,
240–45 (2014).
81. J.J. Colao, Watch Ads, Get Paid: Is This the Future of Ad-Supported Content?,
FORBES (Mar. 1, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2013/03/01/watch-ads
-get-paid-is-this-the-future-of-ad-supported-content/ [https://perma.cc/DHX2-AS9D].
82. See infra Part I.B.4.
83. See generally Goldman, supra note 50, at 1194–97 (discussing attention markets as
marketplace alternatives to regulation); see also Eric Goldman, Data Mining and Attention
Consumption, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY
CONVERSATION 225, 230–32 (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006)
(analyzing targeted marketing based on its costs in attention consumption).
84. For an in-depth discussion on the economics of attention, see generally LANHAM,
supra note 59, at xi–41 (arguing that our attention has decreased in the information age and
beginning the discussion of attention economics).
85. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World,
in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40–41 (Martin Greenberger
ed., 1971).
86. See DAVENPORT & BECK, supra note 44, at 2 (“What’s in short supply is human
attention.”); TOM HAYES, JUMP POINT 73 (2008) (calling attention “the new crude oil”);
LANHAM, supra note 59, at 8–9; Josef Falkinger, Attention Economies, 133 J. ECON. THEORY
266, 268–69 (2007); Webster, supra note 58, at 594; Michael H. Goldhaber, The Attention
Economy and the Net, FIRST MONDAY (Apr. 1997), http://journals.uic.edu/ojs
/index.php/fm/article/view/519/440.
87. See generally Herbert A. Simon—Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (last updated 2016),
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1978/simon-facts.html
[https://perma.cc/HN8N-QNBQ] (winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1978).
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[I]n an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a
dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information
consumes. [Information] consumes the attention of its recipients[,] . . .
creat[ing] a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention
efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might
consume it.88
Early use of labor (i.e., labor certificates) as currency was closely associated
with attention.89 Economist Karl Marx’s labor theory of value explains that the
value of a “thing” depended on the human time it took to produce it. Other
economists’90 price theory explains that price reflects supply and demand.91
Attention’s “value”—to put a price on attention—is increasing92 as the demands
for our attention are increasing93 because the supply of our attention is finite and
largely inelastic.94 Figure 195 illustrates this point, showing the effects of a positive
demand shock with an elastic supply curve versus an inelastic supply curve,
wherein the intersection near D2 on the inelastic curve has a higher price point than
the intersection near D1 on the elastic curve as the demands increase from the
starting point at the intersection near D0.

88. See Simon, supra note 85, at 40–41 (emphasis added).
89. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
90. Other economists often derided Marx and his theories. See, e.g., Joseph V. Femia, An
Image in a Curved Mirror: Pareto’s Critique of Marxist Science, in THE LEGACY OF MARXISM:
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES, CONFLICTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 25, 26 (Matthew Johnson ed.
2012) (“Opponents of Marxism have found [Marx’s] claims laughable. Karl Popper, one of
the more prominent critics, derided Marx and his followers as scientific imposters, whose
vague and elastic terminology allowed them to ‘explain away’ whatever phenomena that might
seem to render their theory erroneous.”).
91. E.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & CARL E. WALSH, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 69–71
(4th ed. 2006) (using the law of supply and demand to explain how prices are determined in
competitive markets).
92. See Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, User-Generated
Ads, and the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 722 (2010) (“The ‘market’ for
speech faces problems of access (or supply) intimately tied to problems of attention (or
demand) . . . .”).
93. See, e.g., id. at 721; Manson, supra note 1.
94. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing attention’s outer limit as time, which itself is limited).
95. Jesse Edgerton, Estimating Machinery Supply Elasticities Using Output Price
Booms 3 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2011-03,
2010). The figure has been modified by adding D2 and its corresponding arrow.
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Figure 1. Effects of a positive demand shock with elastic and inelastic supply curves

C. The Problems Associated with Attention
Attention has increasing value, yet an individual’s attention is up for grabs or
demanded freely by advertisement, spam, and scams.96 In a recent Fourth Circuit
case, doctors demanded the attention of women seeking abortions through mandatory
ultrasounds based on North Carolina’s new law, “even if the woman actively
‘avert[s] her eyes’ and ‘refus[es] to hear.’”97 The problems demonstrated here call
for recognizing the right to attention.98
1. Marketing: Advertisement, Spam, and Scams
Attention has value,99 yet people treat attention as though it is free to grab.100
Individuals presumably own their attention and can give it out at their free will.
However, whether individuals can actually give attention out at their free will can
depend on how disciplined they are. The underlying assumption is that individuals
can control their own attention101 when, in reality, that might not be the case. An

96. See infra Part I.C.1.
97. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85(b) (West Supp. 2014)).
98. See infra Part II.A.2.
99. See supra Part I.B.
100. See MCLELLAND, supra note 77, at 189. Note that individuals could try to be insulated
from distractions if they wanted to (e.g., by wearing earplugs or (noise-cancellation)
earphones), but this would require them to put in their own efforts.
101. This Article assumes no use of pharmaceutical supplements to boost an individual’s
focused attention (e.g., caffeine or Adderall). For a discussion on pharmaceuticals, see
generally Jasper L. Tran, Timing Matters: Prior Art’s Age Infers Patent Nonobviousness, 50
GONZ. L. REV. 189 (2014/2015). For a discussion on patents, see generally Jasper L. Tran,
Rethinking Intellectual Property Transactions, 43 S.U. L. REV. 149, 152–57 (2015)
(discussing components of a patent license); Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One-Year
Review of Alice v. CLS Bank, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 532, 534, 539–40 (2015).
This Article also does not account for illnesses that affect an individual’s ability to control his
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individual’s attention can be demanded through his or her sense of audio (through
speech)102 or sense of vision (through images103 or video).104
We live in an era of unstoppable distractions,105 where we are constantly
bombarded with e-mails, text messages, Facebook,106 music, vehicle noises, etc.
“[T]he power of marketing . . . is eroding from lack of attention.”107 The marketing
industry is built on attracting and keeping people’s attention.
A distraction108 is, by definition, “something that makes it difficult to think or pay
attention.”109 Thus, a distraction is essentially an unwanted and unwelcomed
intrusion on an individual’s attention.110 In fact, advertisements and spam111 are
simply large-scale distractions that affect many people.112 Spam comes in many
shapes and forms including spam e-mails and spam phone calls—especially with the

or her attention (e.g., Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)). For a discussion on
pharmacotherapy and ADHD, see generally Jefferson B. Prince, Timothy E. Wilens, Thomas
J. Spencer & Joseph Biederman, Pharmacotherapy of ADHD in Adults, in ATTENTION-DEFICIT
HYPERACTIVITY DISORDER: A HANDBOOK FOR DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 826 (Russell A.
Barkley ed., 4th ed. 2015). See also Eric Lindenfeld & Jasper L. Tran, Beyond Preemption of
Generic Drug Claims, 45 SW. L. REV. 241 (2015) (discussing generic drugs); Eric Lindenfeld
& Jasper L. Tran, Prescription Drugs and Design Defect Liability: Blanket Immunity
Approach to the Increased Costs and Unavailability of Prescription Medication, 64 DRAKE L.
REV. 111 (2016) (discussing prescription drugs).
102. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 92, at 724. Note that Tushnet does not limit her
commentary to demands for aural attention. Many of her other examples are visual.
103. Cf. id. at 775–76 (discussing puffery in visual advertising and whether that puffery
should be regulated).
104. See, e.g., id. at 739 (discussing example of a video ad); see also Stuart v. Camnitz,
774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (invalidating North Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound law as
unconstitutional because it violated physicians’ free speech rights).
105. However, the availability of 3D printing in the near future might mitigate these
distractions because we will depend less on, and thus interact less with, other people for
manufactured goods. For a discussion on 3D printing, see generally Jasper L. Tran, The Law
and 3D Printing, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 505 (2015); Jasper L. Tran, To
Bioprint or Not To Bioprint, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2015).
106. See generally James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137,
1144–49 (2009).
107. KEN SACHARIN, ATTENTION! HOW TO INTERRUPT, YELL, WHISPER, AND TOUCH
CONSUMERS 3 (2001).
108. Some also call this “noise.” See, e.g., W. Trammell Neill & Richard L. Westberry,
Selective Attention and the Suppression of Cognitive Noise, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 327 (1987).
109. Distraction, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/distraction [https://perma.cc/BQN9-VST3] (last updated 2015).
110. Note that wanted distractions also exist (often from our loved ones), but this Article
focuses solely on unwanted and unwelcomed distractions.
111. “Spam[ming]” means sending the same message indiscriminately to a large number
of recipients. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1195 (11th ed. 2003).
112. People use advertisements and spam interchangeably. The term “spam” carries a
negative connotation. People generally view advertisements in a more positive light.
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high frequency of advertisements in landline phones, more and more Americans are
dropping landline phones to use cell phones exclusively.113
When individuals becomes distracted, they lose their productivity and become
inefficient at completing the task(s) at hand. The economic loss from advertisements
and spam is enormous: for example, a lawyer with a billing rate of $150/hour who
receives 2200 spam messages in a year would lose $900/year in billing to spam
e-mails.114 In 2010, valid e-mail addresses around the world received about 100
billion e-mails per day, 88% of which were spam.115 Companies spent about $6.5
billion/year on anti-spam technology.116 Assuming an average person’s time is worth
$25/hour and that it takes an average of five seconds to delete spam, spam costs users
about $14 billion/year.117 Yet, advertisements and spam occur daily, and are in fact
a multi-billion dollar industry.118
The problem119 worsens in the cases of scams (i.e., fraudulent advertisements120)
or spam. Although the unfortunate victim121 could initiate a legal action under fraud
laws122 against the scammer, the scammers can “easily . . . cover their tracks,” leaving
scams “widespread, difficult to detect, and hard to prosecute.”123

113. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. BLUMBERG & JULIAN V. LUKE, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, WIRELESS SUBSTITUTION: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL
HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JULY–DECEMBER 2013 1 (2014) (“Preliminary results from the
July–December 2013 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) indicate that the number of
American homes with only wireless telephones continues to grow.”).
114. Don Passenger & Jeff Kirkey, Un-Canned Spam: Getting It Back in the Tin, MICH. B.
J., Mar. 2003, at 36, 36. Note that this assumes an average person can expect 2200 spam
e-mails a year and that readers would look at the e-mails to ensure their legitimacy.
115. Rao & Reiley, supra note 29, at 87 (citing MESSAGING ANTI-ABUSE WORKING GRP.,
EMAIL METRICS REPORT #14 – THIRD AND FOURTH QUARTER 2010 (2011), available at
https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/document/MAAWG_2010_Q3Q4_Metrics
_Report_14.pdf) [https://perma.cc/5SRQ-BTZA].
116. Id. at 100.
117. Id.
118. See William B. Baker, The Complications of Doing Mobile Marketing Legally, J.
INTERNET L., Feb. 2014, at 13, 13 (2014) (“A study for the Mobile Marketing Association
(MMA) in 2013 estimated that mobile marketing communications expenditures will reach
$9.2 billion by 2015.”).
119. Note that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has attempted to tackle
this problem with the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. For a detailed discussion, see
generally infra Part II.D.1.
120. Fraudulent misrepresentation includes, but is not limited to, “bait-and-switch
advertisement” and “deceptive advertisement.”
121. Hebe R. Smythe, Note, Fighting Telemarketing Scams, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 347, 365–69 (1994) (common victims are consumers, legitimate telemarketers, credit card
companies, and lenders).
122. See, e.g., id. at 369–76 (discussing current prosecution mechanisms, including their
limitations).
123. Id. at 363.
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Most people do not want to be disturbed by advertisements, spam, or scams.124
Interestingly, advertisements and spam are mostly unregulated,125 yet scams are
protected against by fraud laws126—consumers can go after scammers but not
advertisers or spammers. But scams result in monetary and time loss, whereas
advertisements and spam result in time loss, at the very least—spam imposes costs
tied to the extent of the distraction that it causes. Money and time are both forms of
currency.127
The degree of intrusiveness of advertisement and spam varies depending on its
platform, whereas more time or monetary loss means more intrusiveness and vice
versa. For example, listing from the least to the most intrusive, there are billboard
ads, junk mail, e-mail-based ads, cell phone texts, and phone calls.128
Our attention would really be in danger the day technology enables marketing
companies to tell whether consumers view their ads (e.g., whether a viewer is
watching a television advertisement). When marketing companies know we are not
paying attention, they can come up with new ways to demand our attention. For
example, they can pause their television ads with a warning sign to resume viewing
the ads—if consumers do not comply or are not paying attention, such ads could
remain paused rather than played until skipped.
The contrast between normal daily advertisements or spam versus fraudulent
advertisements or spam begs the question of whether an individual should be entitled
to initiate a legal action against the advertisement and spam companies for his or her
economic losses.
2. Healthcare: Mandatory Ultrasound
The doctor in Stuart v. Camnitz testified, “‘forcing this experience on a patient
over her objections’ in this manner interferes with the decision of a patient not to
receive information that could make an indescribably difficult decision even more
traumatic and could ‘actually cause harm to the patient.’”129 At the very least,
physicians should owe an ethical obligation to honor their patients’ wishes,130

124. See, e.g., John Reed Stark & Carolyn E. Kurr, Using the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Statutory Weaponry To Combat Spam, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 271, 271 (2006) (“I
do not want your worthless spam.” (quoting Spam I Am, STRANGECOSMOS.COM,
http://strangecosmos.com/content/item/102649.html [https://perma.cc/MV4T-TXHS] (last
updated 2016)).
125. But see Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
126. See Smythe, supra note 121, at 369–76.
127. See supra Parts I.B.2, I.B.3.
128. For example, it takes longer to answer a phone call than, say, to read a billboard
advertisement.
129. 774 F.3d 238, 255 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting declaration of Dr. Gretchen S. Stuart).
130. E.g., id. (“The information is provided irrespective of the needs or wants of the
patient, in direct contravention of medical ethics and the principle of patient autonomy.”).
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especially their requests to be let alone131—this is deeply rooted in the principle of
patient autonomy.132
Also, the physician has an ethical obligation not to “touch” the patient without the
patient’s consent, which is what the ultrasounds really is—probing the patient for the
fetus’s information. The right not to be touched is separate from the right to abortion.
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Stuart from typical “undue burden”133
cases because the Court analyzed North Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound law under
the First Amendment.134 Had the Fourth Circuit analyzed Stuart according to the
pregnant mother’s rights, the “undue burden” standard would have and should have
come up.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the mandatory ultrasound ruling applies
only because the state is involved or because it is rooted in physicians’ ethical
obligations generally.135 The Fourth Circuit brought up physicians’ therapeutic
privilege, which “permits physicians to decline or at least wait to convey relevant
information as part of informed consent because in their professional judgment
delivering the information to the patient at a particular time would result in serious
psychological or physical harm.”136 The Fourth Circuit then concluded that North
Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound law, without a therapeutic-privilege exception,
interfered with physician’s professional judgment and ethical obligations.137
Imagine being in the 1970s, when people first heard about the concept of the right
to abortion.138 Most would likely say, “what is that?” and disregard it as nonsense.
Imagine that the Supreme Court analyzed Roe v. Wade139 differently (e.g., under the
physician’s constitutional right140—to perform or not perform an abortion—instead
of under the pregnant woman’s right). Then, more than fifty years later, without Roe
v. Wade decided as it was, we still might not have the right to abortion or the progress

131. “The right to be let alone” is a right under the right to privacy’s bundle of rights. See
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195.
132. For a discussion on the principle of patient autonomy, see generally Mary Anne
Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 291, 330–74 (1994).
133. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–79 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
134. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 249 & n.4.
135. For a general description of doctors’ ethical obligations in the abortion context, see
generally Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s
Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 469–78 (2000).
136. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 254.
137. Id.
138. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the right of privacy to include a
woman’s right to have an abortion).
139. Id.
140. There may be room to argue that the Court decided the case on these grounds. Writing
for the majority, Justice Blackmun explicitly held that the right “is not unqualified.” Id. at 154.
More significantly, the Court held, “For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman’s attending physician.” Id. at 164.
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of the feminism movement.141 There could be a similar story for the right to attention
in Stuart.142 Stuart presented an interesting issue and opportunity for the Supreme
Court to recognize the right to attention for pregnant women—an opportunity the
Court refused when it denied certiorari.
When a pregnant woman actively averted her eyes and refused to hear,143 she
chose to not pay attention to the information from the mandatory ultrasound. The
ultrasound would be pointless and useless because the underlying reason of
displaying a sonogram and describing the fetus to the mother is for her to make an
informed decision. But her objection (e.g., her acts of averting her eyes and refusing
to hear) flies in the face of the legislature’s objective behind North Carolina’s new
law—to assure the mother’s decision to have an abortion is deliberate and
well-informed, or to dissuade the mother through an attempt to spur creation of an
emotional bond with the fetus.144 Ironically, most women who pay attention to the
ultrasound report being relieved to see the fetus because, in most cases, it is very
early in the pregnancy and the fetus does not look like a child at this stage, reinforcing
the women’s decisions to abort.145
North Carolina justified its mandatory ultrasounds based on the idea that the fetus
information is relevant to the mother’s decision making.146 Sure, a patient has the
right to know147 about the fetus she is about to abort, information that the physicians
would be happy to provide. But what about when the patient does not want to know?
Forcing such images of her soon-to-be-aborted fetus into her head is quite something
else—it might have an opposite effect: rather than being fully informed to make a
decision about abortion, the mother might be traumatized after the abortion for
having seen her fetus’s images when she did not want to know such information.
A patient arguably has the right not to know148 information about her fetus when
she does not want to. If the state argues that it is providing information relevant to
the decision—as opposed to the information that serves the supposed state interest in
preserving the life of the fetus—then it raises the question of why the patient can

141. Note that the feminism movement preceded the right to abortion era, but the Roe v.
Wade decision helped the feminism movement move forward.
142. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 255–56.
143. Id. at 242.
144. See generally Paul Stam, Woman’s Right to Know Act: A Legislative History, 28
ISSUES L. & MED. 3 (2012).
145. Cf. One Week Later, Women Denied an Abortion Feel More Regret and Less Relief
than Those Who Have One, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org
/media/nr/2013/08/05/index.html [https://perma.cc/775Y-9DZN] (discussing that 90 percent
of women who were able to obtain an abortion reported that they were relieved afterward).
146. See Stam, supra note 144, at 36 (“‘[I]f the woman is denied information such as the
opportunity for an ultrasound and the information relevant to her decision such as provided
for in this [mandatory ultrasound] bill, she stands little chance of being able to make a fully
informed choice.’” (quoting testimony of Monsignor David Brockman)).
147. See Woman’s Right to Know Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90-21.80 to -21.92 (West
Supp. 2014).
148. Cf. Gert Helgesson, Autonomy, the Right Not To Know, and the Right To Know
Personal Research Results: What Rights Are There, and Who Should Decide About
Exceptions?, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28, 28 (2014) (describing the right not to know in
research).
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reject relevant information. The core of this question relies on how an individual
reaches decisions. If information presented in particular ways (e.g., mandatory
ultrasounds) affects the person in a way that changes her mind (e.g., creates an
indelible image in her mind that triggers emotions that permanently affect her), then
the information coupled with attention is arguably a factor in making the person who
she is. This deep notion of autonomy—the right to construct the person that you are
through control, where possible, is one of the factors that affects personal growth. In
Wisconsin v. Yoder,149 a case about compulsory school attendance, the Supreme
Court respected a similar kind of right. Under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, Amish parents claimed the right to control the factors that would make
their children who they would become as adults.150 In short, the patient’s right not to
know falls within her bundle of attention rights—the right not to know151 and the
right to look away.152
II. RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT TO ATTENTION
A. When the Right to Attention Arises
At one time, a person engaged with others outside of the household only by
intentionally leaving home. Even then, the individual ordinarily interacted with a
bounded universe of others when he or she attended school, entered a store, etc. The
universe expanded only if he or she entered a public square (e.g., a town center,
shopping area, public street, etc.). Today, even if we live alone and do not leave our
homes, we are bombarded with unwanted messages through unsolicited phone calls
and on the Internet, through pop-ups, spam, and other actions that are hard to ignore.
These intrusions, which demand attention and are designed to be difficult to ignore,
impose costs on individuals and invade what can be thought of as personal spaces
that should be subject to personal control.
Technology has changed so that today we are constantly and often involuntarily
bombarded with demands on our attention,153 and the form the demands take—vivid
images, constant interruptions of online experiences, etc.—have become harder to
ignore. This bombardment has made attention more valuable: advertisers will
certainly pay for the ability to command attention.154 The change in technology has
made the right to attention both integral to and distinct from the right to privacy. The
right to be free from unwanted demands on our attention is necessary to allow
individuals to assemble what they see as the relevant inputs in constituting their lives,
in reaching appropriate decisions, and in achieving a measure of happiness. At the

149. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
150. See id. at 221–22.
151. See, e.g., Helgesson, supra note 148, at 28 (describing the right not to know as the
“right to be ignorant by having forgotten”).
152. See infra Part II.A.2.
153. E.g., Johnson, supra note 30 (stating that “we’ve gone from being exposed to about
500 ads a day back in the 1970's to as many as 5,000 a day [in 2006],” and that number is still
climbing).
154. For a discussion of the potential for attention markets, see Goldman, supra note 50,
at 1194–97.
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extreme, constant bombardment with unwanted images can result in sleep
deprivation or even death, if distracted by the images at critical moments. Short of
that, it interferes with the individual’s ability to create the self as a coherent whole,
capable of reaching decisions in accordance with consideration of chosen values and
factors that reflect such values.
The law recognizes a number of concepts that give the individual the right to
control unwanted intrusions into personal “spaces.” These include (1) property
concepts such as trespass and nuisance,155 (2) privacy concepts that create zones of
autonomy and freedom from intrusions,156 and (3) rights to personality that give an
individual the ability to control certain aspects of personhood or personal freedom
such as the use of one’s name, likeness, reputation, etc.157 The law ought to respond
to the increased external demands for attention though recognizing a right to be free
from intrusion if one chooses or to allocate attention in particular ways.158
The idea of a right to privacy, which is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution,
arose during a period of urbanization in which the intrusions of daily life on personal
zones of residence and behavior were increasing.159 Today, new technology
intensifies the assaults on our personal zones of existence not through physical
proximity, but through more subtle intrusions that either compete with each other for
notice (e.g., pop-up ads160) or take the form of commands that we prioritize particular
messages (e.g., mandatory ultrasounds161) over others we might choose.
The idea of a right to attention is a necessary counterpoint to these technological
changes that take the form of demands for our attention.162 It addresses the imbalance
between companies’ ability to use technology to command greater portions of our
attention for profit and our inability to avoid those commands. It thus aids the “little
guy” who may not otherwise be able to fight back. It also preserves for the individual
the freedom to assemble the inputs that allow the construction of a coherent self
capable of making appropriate decisions on the basis of chosen, rather than imposed,
values.163
President Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “The country needs and, unless I mistake its
temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take
a method and try it: If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try
something.”164 He further explained, “The millions who are in want will not stand by

155. See, e.g., Page Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance, and Strict Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REV.
457 (1959).
156. See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195.
157. See Sara R. Benson, Hacking the Gender Binary Myth: Recognizing Fundamental
Rights for the Intersexed, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 31, 50–55 (2005) (proposing
recognition of the fundamental right to personality).
158. See, e.g., supra Part I.C.
159. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1385–86.
160. See supra Part I.C.1.
161. See supra Part I.C.2.
162. See supra Part I.C.1.
163. See Benson, supra note 157, at 50–55 (proposing recognition of the fundamental right
to personality).
164. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, The Country Needs, the Country Demands
Bold, Persistent Experimentation, Address at Oglethorpe University (May 22, 1932), in 1 THE
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silently forever while the things to satisfy their needs are within easy reach.”165 Following
this line of thought, we will not have a right to attention unless we demand it.
1. Why? Justifications for the Right to Attention
a. Attention Has Value, and Its Value Is Increasing166
Attention is a form of currency,167 and, like time, we only have a limited amount
of it.168 Attention can be converted to money.169 One commentator has already
speculated that in the future, our attention will be sold.170 Not only does our attention
have value, but its value is increasing with increasing demands for our attention.171
Therefore, we deserve the recognition of our right to attention.172
Our right to attention is similar to the right to our time173 or the right to our
money.174 Anyone in their right mind would most likely not allow others to take their
time or money freely, in fact, they would probably at least charge some handsome
money for their time. Similarly, others should not be able to take our attention freely.
In fact, it is rather unethical to abridge others’ attention without compensating them
in some way or another. We should be able to take back our attention, which was
rightfully ours in the first place.
We live in a world where advertisement and social media175 populate the
Internet.176 The Internet is everywhere, and everything is happening on the Internet.

PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, at 639, 646 (Samuel L.
Rosenman ed., 1938).
165. Id.
166. See supra Part I.B.
167. See supra Part I.B.1.
168. Of course, pharmaceutical supplements (e.g., Adderall) can enhance an individual’s
focused attention beyond his or her typical daily limit. See generally Jasper L. Tran & Derek
Tri Tran, (De)Regulating Neuroenhancement, 37 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 179, 186–90 (2015)
(discussing neuroenhancements, including Adderall).
169. See supra Part I.B.3.
170. See, e.g., Manson, supra note 1.
171. See supra Part I.B.
172. See supra Part II.A.
173. The right to our time means the right to the ownership of our time—to spend it
however we see fit. This implied right has not been formally recognized yet, but Justice
Holmes commented that a case has no right to the Court’s time. See Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins.
Co., 359 U.S. 437, 460 n.32 (1959).
174. The right to our money means the right to the ownership of our money—to spend it
however we see fit. Similar to the right to our time, the implied right to our money has not
been formally recognized yet. Cf. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process,
and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927, 1976 (2000) (discussing the right to relief in the
context of an action for lost wages).
175. The term “social media” itself implies the use of the Internet as the communication
platform. See, e.g., THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010).
176. See, e.g., Colin M. Leonard & Tyler T. Hendry, From Peoria to Peru: NLRB Doctrine
in A Social Media World, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 199, 201–03 (2013) (discussing the
proliferation of social media in the labor context); supra text accompanying note 30.

1044

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:1023

We use the Internet every day. If the law does not recognize our right to attention,
we may become so easily distracted with all of the advertisements that we might
never get anything done. Now is the perfect time to recognize the right to attention.
Otherwise, law will again move slower than technology.177
b. Attention as a Utilitarian Right
Attention belongs to each individual. Attention is valuable, and its value is
increasing.178 Each individual has certain rights and freedoms. The right to attention
is like the right to sleep.179 Does an individual have a right to sleep because it is
valuable to him or her alone?180 Indeed, an individual has a “right” to have a dog181
or to play music.182 Does he or she have a right to say that a neighbor’s dog cannot
bark in the yard at 4 a.m.? Is this different from the question of whether the
government can use sleep deprivation as a means of interrogation? The argument that
attention is valuable is like the idea of freedom. Right-wing people could assert the
claim to freedom in the name of discriminating against others or skewing the political
system to advance their own ends. Their “freedom” comes at the expense of the
freedom of others. This is the Hohfeldian idea183: assertion of a property right is not
absolute; it occurs in the context of personal relationships.184
Property law is, to an extent, based on the notion of Hohfeldian assignment of
rights. It complements the bundle of rights idea.185 One of the notions is that the

177. Cf. Jasper L. Tran, Press Clause and 3D Printing, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
75, 77 (2016) (“Technology is progressing at an extraordinary speed. New disruptive
technologies are emerging every year. The government has attempted to regulate many
emerging technologies . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). The law lags in other ways too. For
example, it lags behind other disciplines in addressing certain subjects. See Nancy Levit,
Scholarship Advice for New Law Professors in the Electronic Age, 16 WIDENER L.J. 947, 959
(2007) (“[F]or many years ideas originating in other disciplines, such as the sciences and social
sciences, faced a huge lag time before legal academics addressed them.” (citing Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1217, 1225 (2002))).
178. See supra Part I.B.
179. Courts have recognized the right to sleep as a form of protest, tied to a First
Amendment purpose. See Udi Ofer, Occupy the Parks: Restoring the Right to Overnight
Protest in Public Parks, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1155, 1157 (2012) (discussing the right to
sleep in public parks).
180. Cf. id. (discussing the right to sleep in public parks for purposes of protest).
181. “At least one [state] court stated (while quoting Am. Jur.) that all people have a right
to own a pet.” Bruce A. Levin & Michael Spak, Lions & Lionesses, Tigers & Tigresses, Bears
& . . . Other Animals: Sellers’ Liability for Dangerous Animals, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537,
554 (1983) (citing Collins v. Otto, 369 P.2d 564, 566 (Colo. 1962)).
182. Cf. Amanda Reid, The Power of Music: Applying First Amendment Scrutiny to
Copyright Regulation of Internet Radio, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 233, 258–59 (2012)
(discussing the right of webcasters to distribute playlists and the dissemination of compilations
of non-original speech as within the First Amendment’s protections).
183. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence
from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 986–87.
184. Id. at 988 (“Just as privileges do not imply rights, rights do not imply privileges.”).
185. See, e.g., Gormley, supra note 159, at 1335 (discussing components of the right to
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assertion of a property right against someone else limits their freedom and vice
versa.186 The question of how best to enforce rights then follows from seeing the
rights in terms of personal relationships rather than relationships between properties.
According to the Hohfeldian construct, a right to attention would not be created until
there has been an infringement of that right;187 for example, an advertisement seeking
our attention. But this is a scenario that would almost always be true given the
amount of ads we receive per day.
The Coase theorem deals with this, too.188 Under the Coase theorem, consider
whether the individual should have to pay for a right to be free from intrusion (e.g.,
whether there should be a market for distraction-free electronic products) or
whether the advertiser should have to pay for the right to intrude.189 Our current
model is that to have access to an ad-free version of an iPhone app, one has to pay
a nominal fee like $5 or $10 per app. This could eventually get too costly and is
not an option for everyone, which creates a distinction based on wealth or
socioeconomic class.190 Because this Article focuses on the “little guy,” it assumes
that most customers—ones with not much money for extra expenses—would likely
not pay for an ad-free version and would instead put up with the ads.
Furthermore, the debate on the right to attention mirrors the classic exchange
between University of Texas Law Professor John Robertson191 and University of
California Hastings Law Professor Radhika Rao192 about the right to reproduce.

privacy).
186. See Singer, supra note 183, at 987 (“‘[I]f X has a right against Y that he shall stay off
the former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay
off the place.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 32 (1913))).
187. Cf. id. at 1005 (discussing Bentham’s theory that liberties impose a duty “‘where the
subject, having seen his liberty infringed in any point or seen cause to apprehend its being
infringed, stands in need of an express declaration, an assurance on the part of the law to ease
him of his fears’” (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 99 (H.L.A. Hart ed.
1970))).
188. See generally Goldman, A Coasean Analysis, supra note 50, at 1194–97 (discussing
attention markets as marketplace alternatives to regulation).
189. See id.
190. See Robert Reich, Why So Many Americans Feel So Powerless, HUFFPOST POLITICS:
THE BLOG (Apr. 27, 2015, 8:10 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/why-so
-many-americans-fee_b_7150874.html [https://perma.cc/CX56-NK26] (noting that less
consumer choice leads to less consumer power). See generally INEQUALITY FOR ALL (72
Productions 2013).
191. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, The Right To Procreate and in Utero Fetal Therapy, 3
J. LEGAL MED. 333 (1982); see also Elizabeth Price Foley, Human Cloning and the Right To
Reproduce, 65 ALB. L. REV. 625, 627–30 (2002) (discussing whether we have an affirmative
right to reproduce).
192. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive
Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1998) (discussing “the claim that the Constitution
guarantees reproductive autonomy but finds no general right to procreate or not procreate;
instead, the rights of, privacy, bodily autonomy, and equal protection work together in certain
contexts to afford protection to discrete acts involved in procreation”).
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Robertson argued many years ago that there was an affirmative right to reproduce.193
He argued that reproduction was valuable to the individual194 and that the line of the
mandatory sterilization cases infringe the right to procreate.195 On the other hand,
Rao argued against an affirmative right to reproduce but in the form of a negative
privacy right—a right to be free from offensive government intrusions.196 What made
the intrusions, like mandatory sterilization, offensive was a combination of the
degree of intrusion (surgery or other physical invasions of the body are definitely
intrusive) and extent of impact (here, deprivation of the ability to reproduce affects
a substantial life activity).197 Rao thus claimed, in effect, that the real constitutional
interest was the privacy one; the right to be free from certain kinds of interventions
and that any “right to reproduce” was derivative.198 Given that Rao had the better
read of the Supreme Court cases,199 the right to attention is a negative right under the
right to privacy’s umbrella of rights.
c. Attention as Individual Dignity
Under the Kantian approach,200 an individual’s ability to control that to which he
pays attention is an important component of his ability to determine who he can
become as a person, the type of life he wishes to lead, and his meaningful consent
(or lack thereof) to individual transactions.201 Wholesale deprivation of the ability to

193. See Robertson, supra note 191.
194. See id. at 338–39.
195. See id. at 339 & n.38.
196. See Rao, supra note 192, at 1113–16.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. My reading of the cases supports Rao’s assertion. The cases do not necessarily support
the right to attention, but the underlying idea of the right to attention could be found under the
cases’ framework—as a negative privacy right.
200. See Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1251 (1990) (discussing “Kantian
norms of individual dignity and worth”). Baker summarizes the Kantian approach:
For rational beings all stand under the law that each of them should treat himself
and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end
in himself. But by so doing there arises a systematic union of rational beings
under common objective laws—that is, a kingdom. Since these laws are directed
precisely to the relation of such beings to one another as ends and means, this
kingdom can be called a kingdom of ends (which is admittedly only an Ideal).
Id. at 1251 n.246 (emphasis in original) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS § 75 (H.J. Paton trans. 1948), in H.J. PATON, THE MORAL LAW 95
(1978)). For more discussion of the Kantian approach, see generally IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS § 75 (H.J. Paton trans. 1948), in H.J. PATON,
THE MORAL LAW 95 (1978); BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
357–67, 367 (1980); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 172, 198 (1978); AMY
GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY (1980); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L.
REV. 245, 262 n.83 (1983); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a
Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 912–21 (1981).
201. See sources cited supra note 200.
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control attention is torture; thus, government interrogators often use sleep
deprivation or bombard suspects with unwanted distractions, such as loud music,202
to make it hard for the suspects to focus attention in ways that allow them to resist
interrogators. These acts, which involve both the deprivation of the ability to direct
attention and the forced direction of attention, are torture.203 And when the
government allows them, it violates a person’s rights in many contexts, rights that go
to bodily integrity and freedom from coerced confessions.204 Attention is thus part of
what we treat as a right to individual dignity (or exercise of free will in making
choices or other formulations you may choose), called for by natural law.205
d. Freedom of Choice
We each have the freedom of choice206 to spend our attention however and
whenever we want. The right to choose (also referred to as the right of choice) has
been enumerated in many forms.207 Why not the right to attention? As argued, the
right to attention is already a part of the privacy right’s bundle of rights.208
Recognizing the right to attention gives the “little guys” more privacy and control
over their lives and their daily decisions.
Like the right to privacy, the right to attention is arguably a fundamental personal
right.209 Justice Brandeis articulated, “The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They knew that only a
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material

202. E.g., Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that plaintiffs
were detained and interrogated in Iraq and were allegedly, among other things, “subjected to
sleep deprivation, prolonged exposure to cold, [and] intolerably loud music”).
203. See, e.g., id. (noting that the Army Field Manual forbids several of the interrogation
techniques at issue as “torture” but declining to address whether these practices are a crime).
204. An example of freedom from coerced confessions is the Miranda warning
requirement in custodial interrogation under the Fifth Amendment. See generally Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
205. See supra note 200.
206. Cf. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 672
(1980) (discussing limits on a child’s freedom of choice in seeking a mate).
207. See David H. Gans, The Unitary Fourteenth Amendment, 56 EMORY L.J. 907, 911
(2007) (discussing the right to choose abortion); Note, Rethinking the Boundaries of the Sixth
Amendment Right to Choice of Counsel, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1550 (2011) (discussing the right
to choice of counsel).
208. See generally supra Part II.A.2.
209. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(“[T]he right of privacy is a fundamental personal right, emanating ‘from the totality of the
constitutional scheme under which we live.’” (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting))). But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989)
(holding that a fundamental right needs to be not just “‘fundamental’” but also “an interest
traditionally protected by our society”). The focus on attention is still new; thus, it is unknown
whether attention is an interest our society should protect. But this Article takes the stand that
attention should be a protected asset. See also Goldman, supra note 50, at 1194–97 (discussing
attention markets as marketplace alternatives to regulation).
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things.”210 Attention is a resource that can lead to an individual’s happiness, whereas
distraction is rarely welcomed. The freedom of choice to spend one’s attention must
be respected and protected to the utmost.
2. What? To Recognize the Right to Attention
We own and are entitled to our attention, yet advertisement companies and scam
artists freely bombard us with their “products” daily, resulting in our own time and
monetary loss.211 If the right to attention is not recognized, states could continue to
freely mandate ultrasounds for pregnant women against their will, as if their attention
were not really theirs in the first place.212 Similarly, other problems in our daily lives
that involve attention would likely continue to go unaddressed. New, emerging
technologies make this an issue of increasing importance.
Given the situation, this Article proposes legislation to recognize the right to
attention213 as a statutory right214 or, alternatively, suggests that the courts recognize
the right to attention as a constitutional right. Specifically, the right to attention’s
much larger, as-yet-poorly-defined bundle of rights215 includes, for example, the
right to deny attention when demanded, the right to be left alone,216 the right not to
be spammed217 and the right not to receive ads when such advertisement is unwanted

210. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
211. See supra Part I.C.1; Rao & Reiley, supra note 29, at 100 (estimating the annual costs
of spam to consumers at nearly $14 billion and estimating firm spending on antispam solutions
at $6.5 billion (citing Richi Jennings, Cost of Spam is Flattening—Our 2009 Predictions,
MUSEUM EMAIL & DIGITAL COMM. (Jan. 28, 2009), http://email-museum.com/2009
/01/28/cost-of-spam-is-flattening-our-2009-predictions/ [https://perma.cc/M6DP-JB7Q])).
212. See supra Part I.C.2. Note that pregnant women could bring their cases to courts, but
without the recognition of the right to attention, courts seem to struggle in addressing these
concerns. See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (invalidating North
Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound law as unconstitutional because it violated physicians’ free
speech rights).
213. The right to attention can also be viewed as a negative right—the right to not be
distracted/disturbed/bothered.
214. Note that this Article does not get into the bill’s details, which a legislature could flesh
out given its resources. Rather, this Article advocates for a new idea that should be in the works.
215. This Article seeks to stimulate more scholarly discussion on the right to attention.
More rights within this bundle of rights will be defined and refined as time goes on.
216. Note the similarity to “‘the right to be let alone’” under the right to privacy’s bundle
of rights. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United
States, Justice Brandeis found the “right to be let alone” as “the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.” 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
217. See Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, Press Sec’y, White House Office of Commc’ns
(May 8, 2001), available at 2001 WL 483484, at *6 (“[T]he President . . . . believes that
consumers should be empowered and individuals should not be subject to numerous or
unwanted spam messages. And that means working very carefully . . . to find the appropriate
balance to protect people’s 1st Amendment rights, also protecting consumers and individuals’
rights to not be spammed when they do their work.”).
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or uninvited,218 the right to waive the understanding of an agreement, the right to
give consent without being informed,219 and the right not to be required to receive
information against one’s will.
The right to attention would primarily be a negative right rather than a positive
right.220 This means the government has no affirmative duty to ensure an individual’s
right to attention (i.e., not a positive right), but each individual has the right not to
have his or her attention demanded or taken away freely without consequences (i.e.,
a negative right).
Furthermore, given that the right to attention is a personal right, it would attach to
each individual and, thus, would not be transferable.221 Also, the right to attention
would only apply to persons and not corporations because entities like corporations
do not have attention.222
The legislature should allow an individual to have a legal action against
advertisement and spam companies for taking away his or her time and attention.223
By asserting the injury of lost time and attention, a litigant could convert the lost time
and attention to the other form of currency (i.e., money) via the remedy of monetary
damages.224 This takes care of the injury and remedy issues. Enactment of this
proposal would give each individual the necessary standing to initiate a legal action
against advertisement corporations, empowering them to stand up for themselves to
take back what is rightfully theirs in the first place—their attention.
Recognizing the right to attention would also allow individuals to not be subject
to needless, mandatory ultrasounds against their wills.225 Recognizing the right to
attention would help form contracts226 or a more informed consent.227 Without
recognizing the right to attention, contract formation and informed consent are

218. See id.
219. See Vadim S. Rotenberg, To Inform or Not To Inform—A Decision with
Psychobiological Implication, 16 MED. & L. 49, 52 (1997) (“[T]he patient with a ‘fatal’ illness
has the right not to be informed about his illness in order to be free from renunciation of search
and helplessness.”).
220. See supra Part II.A.1.b. This is similar to the right to abortion, where a pregnant
mother is entitled to have an abortion, but the government does not need to provide funds or
access to such abortion (except when it is necessary to save the pregnant mother’s life). See
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
221. In New York, for example, the right of publicity is a privacy claim that is personal to
an individual, is non-transferable, and is extinguished upon the individual’s death. See Smith
v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 499 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168 (App. Div. 1986). This is
similar to the right to privacy.
222. Cf., e.g., Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp., 195 Cal. Rptr. 393, 411 (Ct. App. 1983)
(“[C]orporations have a lesser right to privacy than human beings and are not entitled to claim
a right to privacy in terms of a fundamental right . . . .”). Furthermore, corporations are fictional
entities that do not have the five human senses, which is where the ability to pay attention
comes from.
223. See supra Part I.C.1.
224. See supra Parts I.B.2 & I.B.3.
225. See supra Part I.C.2.
226. See infra Part II.C.2.
227. See infra Part II.C.1.
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hollow and superfluous228: contracting parties have no meeting of the minds229 and
informed consent is giving consent without being informed.230 In short, recognizing
the right to attention would give the “little guys” more privacy and control over their
lives and their daily decisions.
To infringe on an individual’s right to attention, the government would probably
be subject to some level of intermediate-scrutiny review,231 rather than
rational-basis232 or strict-scrutiny review.233 It is too easy to satisfy rational basis,
which would make the right to attention superfluous. Similarly, strict-scrutiny review
for the right to attention (unlike, for example, the right to vote) is likely too high of
a standard.
Note that a requirement to read a written contract is easier for an individual to
ignore than a requirement to watch a video or to listen to audio. Thus, insistence on
delivering information that is harder to ignore (e.g., by requiring watching a video or
listening to audio) as a condition for, for example, buying an audio recording or
consenting to in vitro fertilization (IVF)234 should be more offensive than imposing
an easier requirement (e.g., requiring reading a written contract). The contexts seem
different: buying a recording is usually about copyright, whereas IVF has risks which
may impact the mother or the child. Individuals can voluntarily waive their right to
attention, but others intruding on their right to attention should not assume waiver of
that right. Note that this only applies when individuals are forced to give up their
right. A notice to individuals inquiring or requesting a waiver of their right to
attention would be a start and should be enforceable. In other words, giving up the
right to attention cannot be a condition (i.e., waiver of the right to attention cannot
be forced), but individuals can voluntarily waive their right to attention. For example,
either access to a contract or to an abortion can be conditioned on the waiver of the
right to attention.
3. How? Where the Right to Attention Can Come From
One scholar examined 100 years of the right to privacy and concluded that
scholars were “unable to agree on a one-size-fits-all definition of legal privacy

228. See infra Part II.C.
229. See infra Part II.C.2.
230. See infra Part II.C.1.
231. The intermediate-scrutiny review discussed here follows the same intermediate
scrutiny under the constitutional standard of review for an equal protection claim. That is, the
government must prove that the regulation is substantially related to an important government
interest. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225 (1995).
232. Under the rational-basis standard of review for an equal protection claim, the
regulation’s challenger must prove that the regulation is not rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
233. Under the strict-scrutiny standard of review for an equal protection claim, the
government must prove that the regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling government
interest. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984).
234. For a discussion on IVF, see generally June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Embryo
Fundamentalism, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1015 (2010); June Carbone, Who Decides
What Number of Children Is “Right”?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 109 (2009).
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because it actually consists of five distinct species”: (1) tort privacy, (2) Fourth
Amendment privacy, (3) First Amendment privacy, (4) fundamental-decision
privacy, and (5) state constitutional privacy.235 Similarly, the right to attention can
come from many different places as well: (1) the right to privacy under the U.S.
Constitution, (2) statutes, (3) economic/property rights, or (4) human rights.
Upon reviewing the literature, the right to attention has appeared before in only
one context: minors’ right to attention from their parents.236 There is no reason why
this should not be extended to be an individual’s right. The Supreme Court could
start here—minors’ right to attention from their parents—and expand it to all
individuals.
The right to attention can stem from other existing rights. For instance,
constitutionally, the right to attention237 can be interpreted as part of the “right to
privacy[’s]”238 “bundle of rights”239 as guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments240 and their penumbrae.241 Specifically, the
penumbrae and Ninth Amendment contain many unenumerated rights,242 one of
which could include the right to attention. Alternatively, rather than falling under the
right to privacy’s umbrella of rights, the Supreme Court could read the right to
attention from the Constitution’s First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments and their penumbrae. Constitutional law itself is a romantic subject.243

235. Gormley, supra note 159, at 1335 (discussing 100 years of the right to privacy).
236. Note that the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has advocated for “children
hav[ing] the right to attention from both parents.” UNICEF, Article 18, YOUTUBE (Sept. 28, 2007),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m3wTJ30FaCQ&list=PLtPoovv4KdsIxNzFBQoYJhRiz6nm
1oZ2v&index=16 [https://perma.cc/7Q8H-G42X]. For a discussion on UNICEF, see generally
About UNICEF, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/about/who/index_introduction.html (last
updated May 12, 2015). Although the United Nations’ concept is different from the concept
articulated in this Article, why shouldn’t the United States extend a similar-but-unqualified
right to attention to each individual, including adults?
237. The right to attention is a right viewed from the information receiver’s perspective.
This leads to some overlap between the right to attention and the right to privacy. If we draw
a Venn diagram between the two rights’ bundle of rights, there are some overlaps and some
differences. The right to attention is a framework, a perspective. Rather than trying to fit this
nicely within our current body of law, this Article offers a fresh perspective to view law from
the angle of “attention.” This was how the body of privacy law got started—looking at law
from the perspective of “privacy.”
238. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15. This was the first article that articulated the right
to privacy.
239. E.g., Steven Winters, Comment, The New Privacy Interest: Electronic Mail in the
Workplace, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 197, 200 (1993) (describing the right to privacy as “a diverse
and growing bundle of rights which derive from four principal sources: The United States
Constitution, state constitutions, statutory sources, and the common law” (footnotes omitted)).
240. See cases cited supra note 16.
241. The penumbrae include the rights guaranteed by implication in the Constitution. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–86 (1965); Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1997).
242. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” (emphasis added)).
243. Cf. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1641, 1641 (1967) (“Our constitutional theory is in the grip of a romantic conception
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What we knew about constitutional law twenty years ago is different from what we
know today, which will again be different from what we know twenty years from
now.
Statutorily, the right to attention can be interpreted as a negative right from, for
example, the right to not be disturbed by others’ loud noises244 (for which one could
call the police to file a noise245 complaint against loud neighbors246) or by noise from
a vehicle.247
Alternatively, the right to attention can be recognized as an economic or property
right, falling under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guaranty of “life, liberty, [and]
property.”248 The right to attention can also be a tort right, for which there could be
a damages remedy.249 The right to attention could also be a human right.250
B. When the Right to Attention Does Not Arise
The right to attention is not absolute—it should have boundaries. The right to
attention generally would not arise if an individual were under an obligation251 or
were to gain a privilege.252 Although it is hard to tell whether an individual is paying
attention, his or her attention can be demanded through, for example, the
administration of an exam.253 Even so, the demanding party would still need a

of free expression, a belief that the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is freely accessible.”).
244. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 342F-30.5 (West 2008) (“[n]oise control” statute
providing for creation of state community noise code).
245. Noise can be subject to time, place, and manner restrictions. See State v. Poe, 88 P.3d
704, 7113 (Idaho 2004) (“[R]easonable time, place, or manner restrictions on speech may be
upheld if they are justified without reference to the content of the speech, and speech may be
proscribed based upon a non-content element, such as noise.” (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992))).
246. Of course, some noise level, such as from a “licensed premises” under Washington
D.C.’s laws, can be permitted depending on a property’s zoning district. See, e.g., D.C. CODE
§ 25-725 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015) (“[n]oise from licensed premises” statute). Also, loud
noises from living or being near aircraft or trains are also permitted because people assume
the risk when living near an airport or the railroad. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 4916 (2012) (setting
“[r]ailroad noise emission standards” that imply that noises near a railroad are permitted on
some level and implying that those who choose to live near a railroad assume the risk of
disturbance caused by noises).
247. See Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901–18 (2012) (commanding emission
standards for manufacturers of noise emitters).
248. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
249. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 219 (describing the remedies for
invasion of privacy as grounded in tort).
250. See generally supra Part II.A.1.c.
251. North Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound requirement is not an obligation to pregnant
women because the new law interferes with a pregnant woman’s right to abort. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
252. The quid pro quo for demanding an individual’s attention is receiving a privilege in
exchange.
253. Assuming he or she wants to pass, of course. Without paying attention, one would not
likely pass an exam.
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legitimate interest to override an individual’s right to attention and require his or her
attention for a finite amount of time. For example,254 to gain the driving privilege, an
individual must pass both the written and driving exams, where he or she must pay
extra careful attention either while taking the written exam or while driving during
the driving exam. The government can justify its requirement of an individual’s
attention because driving a vehicle is like operating a dangerous or deadly weapon
that can easily kill others.255
Clients, customers, and bosses can demand employees’ attention according to
contractual agreement. Under their contractual obligations, employees often must
pay attention to clients, customers, and bosses during the work hours as part of the
job’s requirements. Technically, an employee can choose to not pay attention on the
job, but failure to do so might result in being fired.
Also, the government can demand an individual’s attention, and the individual
can face consequences for not complying.256 For instance, jury duty calls an
individual to serve on a jury, presumably paying attention to the facts at trial to vote
on a verdict. Failure to report for jury duty may result in a fine,257 but a juror faces
no consequence for not paying attention and falling asleep during trial.258 Courts can
summon an individual as a witness via their power to subpoena, and an individual
can face court sanctions resulting in fines or jail time for failure to appear.259 Failure
to respond to a court’s questions during a hearing can result in sanctions or being
disciplined. Similarly, a police officer can arrest or detain an individual with
sufficient probable cause.260
Another exception to the right to attention is that there is no right to attention in a
human relationship.261 Attention is the premise of each human relationship; humans
naturally crave attention and want others’ validation.262 For instance, when a spouse

254. The listed scenarios are not exhaustive. Rather, they serve as a starting place to think
about similar instances.
255. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 597 F. Supp. 2d 155, 157 (D. Me. 2009)
(“Maine law confirms that the act of driving a motor vehicle into another vehicle can constitute
use of a dangerous weapon.” (citing State v. York, 899 A.2d 780, 781–82 (Me. 2006))).
256. This overlaps with other schemes in society: our duty as members of a society and our
obligations to follow the law to belong to society.
257. E.g., Imperial – Ignoring Jury Duty May Result in Fines, LSI (Aug. 19, 2015),
http://www.lsi.org/imperial-ignoring-jury-duty-may-result-in-fines/ [https://perma.cc/TBR8
-N6DV].
258. Cf. People v. Williams, 355 P.3d 444, 470 (Cal. 2015) (holding that “sleeping during
trial constitutes good cause for the dismissal of juror” and implicitly holding that jurors face
no consequences—besides being dismissed—for falling asleep).
259. E.g., State v. Castle, 637 N.E.2d 80, 82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (affirming criminal
contempt for failure to obey subpoenas requiring witness testimony).
260. E.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630 (2003) (per curiam) (“[T]he traditional rule
[is] that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause.” (quoting Hayes v.
Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985))).
261. The human relationship is a personal relationship rather than a commercial one like
in the case of advertisement, spam, and scams. See supra Part I.C.1.
262. See, e.g., Arthur Pearlstein, Pursuit of Happiness and Resolution of Conflict: An
Agenda for the Future of ADR, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 215, 250 (2012) (“[D]esire for
attention or approval . . . ‘[was] implanted . . . within our natures as a substitute for reason or
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stops paying attention to the other partner, the relationship is likely doomed to fail.263
Although a spouse might arguably have the right to attention from the other partner
for dating or marrying that partner, this Article does not advocate for recognizing the
right to attention in domestic disputes, which are personal and can be solved between
the parties. Likewise, this Article does not discuss whether children have a right to
attention from their parents.264
C. Application to Other Contexts
Every exchange of information involves at least two parties, where one side
communicates the information and the other side receives the information.
Scholarship most often focuses on the communicator’s perspective (e.g., how much
information the communicator discloses) or on the information itself,265 but
surprisingly, scholarship does not focus much on the receiver’s perspective.
This lack of discussion and dearth of scholarship from the information receiver’s
perspective is problematic because the receiver is often the “little guy”266 in the
conversation. For those who do not pay attention in reviewing contracts, contracting
parties have no meeting of the minds,267 and “informed consent” could mean giving
consent without being informed.268 Recognizing the right to attention would
legitimize informed consent and contract formation by allowing individuals to waive
their rights to attention.269
1. Healthcare: Informed Consent
Attention is very important to the decision-making process and is especially
crucial in the healthcare decision-making setting. In healthcare, there are usually two
parties in each conversation270: physicians as the communicator and patients as the
information receiver. If the receiver does not pay attention, the communication chain
is broken. Interesting cases arise in the informed-consent regime.

virtue.’” (quoting Douglas W. Kmiec, The Human Nature of Freedom and Identity—We Hold
More than Random Thoughts, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 47 (2005))); id. (“‘[A]ttention
addresses a fundamental human desire. . . . While many of us crave huge amounts of
recognition, the lure is not merely fame or a place in history. It’s also praise from the people
around you for what you do.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Goldhaber, supra note 60)).
263. See, e.g., Leslie Petruk, Divorce Signs: 6 Indications that Your Marriage Will End,
HUFFPOST: DIVORCE (Oct. 29, 2012, 12:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012
/10/29/divorce-signs_n_2025734.html [https://perma.cc/R2DT-E593] (“Just like other
relationships, if your marriage doesn’t receive the necessary time and attention, it will
deteriorate.”).
264. See supra note 236.
265. See supra note 27.
266. The “little guy” denotes one without authority and whose voice is not being heard.
267. See infra Part II.C.2.
268. See infra Part II.C.1.
269. See infra Parts II.C.1 & II.C.2.
270. The other parties are the hospital and the insurance company, but they are not relevant
to the context at hand—the communication between a patient and his or her physician.
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New York codified the existing common law informed-consent doctrine into the
Medical Malpractice Act, defining the lack of “informed consent” as:
the failure of the person providing the professional treatment or diagnosis
to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and the reasonably
foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical, dental
or podiatric practitioner under similar circumstances would have
disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable
evaluation.271
In short, a physician owes a duty to inform or disclose when the physician takes an
action in cases involving “‘non-emergency treatment, procedure or surgery’ or
procedures that involve ‘invasion or disruption of the integrity of the body.’”272
In recent years, controversies regarding informed consent have been on the rise,
with questions raised over whether and to what extent physicians must disclose
health risks to patients273 and whether and to what extent researchers must disclose
their research findings to participants.274 However, these informed-consent questions
focused solely on the perspective of the physicians, the researchers, or their affiliated
institutions, but not the patients. The underlying assumption is that patients pay
attention and understand most, if not all, information from the physicians and the
researchers.
Can a patient, either intentionally or inadvertently, just not listen, not understand,
or not pay attention to the information coming from physicians or researchers? For
example, the physicians or researchers could speak in medical or scientific language
that the patient does not understand, and thus the patient might not pay attention to
the disclosed information. Or a patient who does not speak English and requires a
translator may not understand the physician’s words through the translator because
the words’ meanings were lost in the translation. Or a patient could simply choose to
not pay attention to the information disclosed.

271. Paula Walter, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: To Inform or Not To Inform?, 71
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 543, 549 (1997) (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1)
(McKinney 1993)).
272. Id. at 551 (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(2) (McKinney 1993)).
273. See, e.g., Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease
Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 350–92 (1974); James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure To
Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 271–326 (1990) (discussing physicians’ failure to warn);
Valerie Gutmann Koch, A Private Right of Action for Informed Consent in Research, 45 SETON
HALL L. REV. 173, 177–83 (2015) (discussing informed consent to treatment); Peter H.
Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 907–41 (1994); Marjorie Maguire
Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J.
219, 232–56 (1985) (discussing physicians’ duty to inform).
274. See, e.g., Capron, supra note 273, at 350–92; Koch, supra note 273, at 183–93
(discussing informed consent in research); Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in
Human Subject Experimentation, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 165–96 (1998); Preston D. Mitchum,
Note, Gene Patents and Informed Consent: The Mythical “Reasonable Person” Standard, 3
BIOTECHNOLOGY & PHARMACEUTICAL L. REV. 79, 79–86 (2010).
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How about when a patient does not get the relevant information not by choice but
rather due to a systemic problem? The critical question is what physicians should tell
patients, and lawyers would often advise physicians to tell patients everything—every
possible scenario, no matter how unlikely. However, “Many consent forms are 15 to
20 pages long. . . . [T]o simply read a document that is 20 pages long would mean a
time spent of approximately 60 minutes.”275 Consent forms that are lengthy and filled
with legalese actually obscure rather than illuminate relevant information.276 Instead
of directing patients’ attention to the relevant information to inform patients, these
forms do the opposite—distract the patients with unhelpful information.277
This is the negative consequence of telling patients everything. For example, a
patient who needs a wisdom tooth removed might face an extremely rare chance of
death,278 but does the patient need to know that? Most people think not, because
knowing would likely deter most patients, especially millennials who are (at least in
terms of finances) more risk averse than previous generations,279 from undergoing
this typically safe treatment. Thus, patients would then have to deal with the
consequences of not undergoing the procedure. Either way, the patients suffer.
Alternatively, patients also suffer when their physicians withhold information
either intentionally or because the physicians are used to doing things a certain
way.280 Ultimately, what patients would want to know most is the information that
would allow them to make better choices (e.g., this anesthesia is better than that one)
and to know what their physician’s opinion is or which treatment their physician
would recommend.
Once a patient, either intentionally or inadvertently, just does not listen, does not
understand, or does not pay attention to the information coming from physicians or
researchers, the question becomes whether a patient was informed in giving his or
her “informed consent.” Evidently not, and the so-called informed consent becomes
superfluous and hollow281—it is just consent without being informed. The objective
behind informed consent is actually evidenced by the heavy emphasis on the word
“informed” rather than “consent,”282 though both terms are still important. Informed

275. Anvita Pandiya, Readability and Comprehensibility of Informed Consent Forms for
Clinical Trials, 1 PERSP. CLINICAL RES. 98, 99 (2010).
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See, e.g., Maine Teenager Dies After Wisdom Teeth Removed, CBS NEWS (Feb. 27,
2014, 4:55 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/maine-teenager-dies-after-wisdom-teeth
-removed/ [https://perma.cc/P89Y-ZDC4] (“[D]eath from complications of oral surgery is so
rare that its frequency cannot be accurately estimated.”).
279. E.g., Steven Russolillo, Chart of the Day: Millennials Are Really Risk Averse, WALL
ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (May 29, 2014, 2:37 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014
/05/29/chart-of-the-day-millennials-are-really-risk-averse/ [https://perma.cc/DQQ6-86GC].
280. See Mark A. Rothstein & Gil Siegal, Health Information Technology and Physicians’
Duty To Notify Patients of New Medical Developments, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93,
133–34 (2012) (discussing physicians’ duty to notify and its practical concerns, including
patients’ privacy and (in some cases) patients’ “lack of health literacy” interfering with their
“ability to understand health information”).
281. This is very similar to the analysis of contract formation. See infra Part II.C.2.
282. Cf. Edward L. Raab, The Parameters of Informed Consent, 102 TRANSACTIONS AM.
OPHTHALMOLOGICAL SOC’Y 225, 229 (2004) (discussing conceiving of informed consent “as
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consent is a great idea,283 but it will not work if patients are not paying attention.284
Recognizing the right to attention would allow the patient to waive his or her
respective right to attention. That is, the patient would effectively waive his or her
right to an informed consent while still giving consent.285
Given that an individual’s attention span is limited and easily lost after reading
pages after pages of text, the hospital should summarize the consent form in one
paragraph in bold, separately initialed or read to the patient. These are efforts to
command attention and thus demonstrate that consent is informed. Informed consent
forms are becoming meaningless rituals, but with the right delivery, they can
effectively compel attention rather than burying salient points in ways that obscure
them.
2. Adhesion Contract: Contract Formation
To form a contract, the offeror offers, followed by the offeree’s acceptance.286
There are two contracting parties. In the case of an adhesion contract, the offeror has
the commanding power, whereas the offeree often must “take-it-or-leave-it.”287 The
offeror (i.e., the communicator) often attempts to communicate the contract’s terms
to the offeree (i.e., the information receiver), and the offeree attempts to listen to
understand what he or she is getting himself or herself into.288 But what happens
when the offeree, intentionally or inadvertently, does not pay attention in either
listening or reading the adhesion contract’s terms?
This scenario occurs quite often. For example, before individuals can live in an
apartment, they must sign a rental agreement setting out the terms of the lease,
regardless of whether they read the agreement. Before individuals can download a
computer program (e.g., Apple’s iTunes)289 or join a website (e.g., Facebook)290 or
find out more information about their DNA (e.g., 23andMe),291 they must click “I

a process, not as a paper”).
283. Interview with Bryan Liang, M.D., Ph.D., J.D. and Arthur W. Grayson Professor of
Law & Medicine, Southern Illinois University Schools of Law and Medicine,
AUDIOLOGYONLINE (May 9, 2000), http://www.audiologyonline.com/interviews/interview
-with-bryan-liang-m-1822 [https://perma.cc/A7G5-RNA3] (“[W]ritten informed consent is a
good idea . . . .”).
284. See Pandiya, supra note 275, at 98.
285. See supra Part II.A.2.
286. See U.C.C. § 2-206 (2014). In forming a contract, there is also consideration and a
meeting of the minds. See, e.g., Caroline N. Bruckel, Consideration in Exclusive and
Nonexclusive Open Quantity Contracts Under the U.C.C.: A Proposal for a New System of
Validation, 68 MINN. L. REV. 117, 118 (1983).
287. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1174 (1983).
288. Cf. id. at 1177 (discussing the details of the deal timeline and how offeree dickers
about the terms).
289. See Henry Sprott Long III, Note, Reconsidering the “Balance” of the “Digital First
Sale” Debate: Re-Examining the Case for a Statutory Digital First Sale Doctrine To Facilitate
Second-Hand Digital Media Markets, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1191 (2008).
290. See Grimmelmann, supra note 106, at 1145 n.26.
291. See generally Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-05682-LHK, 2014 WL
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Accept” to an adhesion contract provided by the company,292 regardless of whether
they read the agreement.
Without reading the agreement, the party with little voice—the offeree in an
adhesion contract—effectively waives his or her rights. The American culture has
become fixated on contracts’ written signatures or initials to protect the interests of
landlords, software companies, and the like without paying much attention293 to the
other contractual party—the offeree.
A lack of attention from the offeree’s side effectively destroys the contract (or at
least its spirit) because there is no meeting of the minds of both parties.294 Some
might consider this agreement waiver (i.e., the offeree waiving his or her right to
understand the contract’s terms but still wanting to go through with it) perhaps due
to trust or simply not understanding the contract or believing that a lack of bargaining
power makes reading the contract’s terms pointless. Regardless, what the offeree
waived was the ability to understand the contract’s terms or, in other words, the
offeree’s right to attention.295 Without recognizing this right to attention, a contract,
though it looks “good” on paper, is in fact hollow and superfluous because there is
no meeting of the minds. Recognizing the right to attention would allow the offeree
to waive his or her respective right to still form a contract.296
Like the suggested improvements for informed consent,297 the offeror should
likewise summarize the contract in one paragraph in bold, separately initialed or read
to the offeree. These are efforts to command attention and thus demonstrate that the
contracting parties had a meeting of the minds. Adhesion contracts are also becoming
meaningless rituals, but with the right delivery, they can effectively compel attention
rather than burying salient points in ways that obscure them.
D. Counterarguments to Recognizing the Right to Attention
1. Narrowing the Communicator’s Freedom of Speech and Fitting the Right into
Current Laws
The strongest counterargument is that recognizing the information receiver’s right
to attention would oppose, and, in effect, narrow the communicator’s freedom of
speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment, including his or her right to
advertise.298

2903752, at *2–*3 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014) (discussing 23andMe’s terms of service).
292. E.g., Long, supra note 289, at 1191.
293. Pun intended.
294. Meeting of the minds is another requirement of contract formation; it is essentially
the spirit behind contract formation. See, e.g., Wilhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 268 N.W.
634, 635 (Minn. 1936); Van Meeruwen v. Swanson, 141 N.W. 112, 113–14 (Minn. 1913); cf.
Viker v. Lien, 109 N.W. 1135, 1135 (Minn. 1906) (“There is no merit to appellant’s claim that
the parties never came to a full agreement.”).
295. See generally supra Part II.A.2.
296. See id.
297. See supra Part II.C.1.
298. See generally Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16 YALE J. ON
REG. 85, 92 (1999).
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However, the focus here is on the receiver, not the communicator.299 If the focus
always stays on the communicator, the receiver would likewise always receive the
shorter end of the stick. Just because the communicator has the freedom of speech,
such freedom is not unlimited and is not without boundaries. In fact, the freedom
of speech itself has boundaries and exceptions.300 It is about time for the receiver
to speak up for his or her respective rights,301 especially the right to attention.302
And it is time to recognize both the communicator’s and the receiver’s respective
rights—rather than just viewing the issue from the communicator’s perspective—and
work together to achieve a fair and reasonable resolution.303
Furthermore, this Article is not advocating for more regulation or prohibition of
the communicator’s speech, but rather, for a recognition of the receiver’s right to
attention.304 Perhaps an unintended effect of recognizing the receiver’s right to
attention could be narrowing the communicator’s speech by a time, place, and
manner restriction.305
Another unintended effect could be making some current law unnecessary, for
example, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.306 The current rule is that (1) callers must provide their names, their
representative institution, and a contact phone number or address; (2) callers cannot
call between 9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m.; and (3) callers must immediately comply with
do-not-call requests.307 However, the FCC’s attempt has fallen short of solving the
problem: it focuses on treatment rather than prevention or cure.308 Putting a
“Band-Aid on a bullet hole” does not solve the long-term distraction problem of
advertisements, spam, and scams. For example, “we’ve gone from being exposed to
about 500 ads a day back in the 1970’s to as many as 5,000 a day [in 2006],”309 and
that number is still climbing. Imagine a future where almost everyone wears Google

299. See supra Parts I.C & II.A.2.
300. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004).
301. See supra Part I.C.
302. See supra Part II.A.2.
303. Cf. Howard M. Erichson, Commentary, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class
Settlements, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1015, 1023 n.40 (2013) (noting that judging in nonclass
settlement aims to come to “‘a fair and reasonable resolution’” for the parties (quoting
Transcript of Proceedings at 38, In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Nov.
9, 2007))).
304. See supra Part II.A.2.
305. See generally William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme
Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 757, 783 n.168 (1986).
306. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
307. Unwanted Telephone Marketing Calls, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov
/guides/unwanted-telephone-marketing-calls [https://perma.cc/DYK8-49AA] (last updated
Nov. 7, 2015).
308. Cf. Sara Lykken, We Really Need To Talk: Adapting FDA Processes to Rapid Change,
68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 357, 373 (2013) (discussing that treatment, prevention, and cure are all
important).
309. Johnson, supra note 30.
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Glass,310 but ads pop up every three to five minutes. Americans badly need a more
long-term solution—recognizing the right to attention could be a start.
However, our current laws are not perfect, and we should welcome innovative
changes—changes that make sense—for example, North Carolina’s new mandatory
ultrasound law is invalid.311 The right to privacy faced a very similar challenge 125
years ago, until the Supreme Court recognized it as a common-law constitutional
right. Likewise, it is time for a change for our attention, and changes in law have to
start somewhere. Although most of the time the changes are small,312 some bold
changes should be made—especially in this information day and age.
Regardless, given the progression of technology making attention a more valuable
asset,313 it is time to even the playing field and grant the information receiver some
respective rights of his or her own.
2. Assumption of Risk when Not Paying Attention
Others could argue that not paying attention is a choice rather than a right, and
those choosing to not pay attention implicitly assume the risk of doing so.314 This is
especially relevant in the contract formation analysis, where the information receiver
essentially assumes the risk by not paying attention to the contract’s terms.315
This assumption of risk argument would only work in scenarios where the
information receiver intentionally disregards the communicated information.
However, in the situations where the receiver accidentally did not receive the
information for one reason or another, this assumption of risk argument is not
applicable. Even in scenarios where the receiver intentionally disregards the
communicated information, for example, when the mother “‘avert[ed] her eyes’” and
“‘refus[ed] to hear’” about the mandatory ultrasound,316 victim blaming should be
avoided.317

310. Essentially, Google Glass connects to the Internet, providing users access to the World
Wide Web instantly. For a background discussion on Google Glass, see generally Kristin
Bergman, Cyborgs in the Courtroom: The Use of Google Glass Recordings in Litigation, 20
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 15–20 (2014).
311. See supra Part I.C.2.
312. For instance, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, first as a lawyer then later as a jurist, made
small but impactful legal changes over the years to women’s rights.
313. See supra Parts I.B & II.A.
314. For a discussion on implied assumption of risk, see generally Schuck, supra note 273,
at 911–12.
315. See supra Part II.C.2.
316. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 90-21.85(b) (West Supp. 2014)).
317. Cf. Josephine Ross, Blaming the Victim: ‘Consent’ Within the Fourth Amendment and
Rape Law, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 10 (2010) (discussing victim blaming in
rape cases).
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3. Endorsing the Right To Be Ignorant
Some might argue that recognizing the right to attention is like granting or
endorsing people with the right to be ignorant, which can be used as a way to insulate
them from knowing important information. They fear that people would abuse their
right to attention and block out the world. However, this criticism implicitly assumes
being ignorant is necessarily “bad.”
One district court concluded that “[t]he ‘constitutional right to be ignorant’ or ‘the
constitutional right to remain uneducated,’ . . . simply does not exist [for inmates]”318
but also noted that inmates “cannot be forced to learn” either.319 Admittedly, for strict
liability law, there is no right to be ignorant320—individuals can be liable under strict
liability even if they did not know of the law that they violated.321 But outside of the
strict liability regime, it is within an individual’s privacy of personal knowledge to
choose to know or not to know. If we are concerned about need-to-know information,
the government can convey this information to everyone by meeting the intermediate
scrutiny review.322
This Article does not actually endorse the right to be ignorant. Rather, what this
Article is trying to convey is that we have the right to our attention, and in the world
of vast information, we should get to pick and choose which information we
receive.323 The kind of slippery slope argument324 that focuses on one extreme end
(i.e., knowing nothing) would unlikely become the reality because rather than falling
at either extreme end, the reality tends to fall somewhere in the middle, the
equilibrium between knowing everything and knowing nothing.
CONCLUSION
The dearth of scholarship from the information receiver’s perspective is
problematic because the information receiver is often the “little guy” in the
conversation. We own and are entitled to our attention, yet advertisement companies
and scam artists freely bombard us with their “products” daily, resulting in our own
time and monetary loss. Without recognizing the right to attention, contract

318. Rutherford v. Hutto, 377 F. Supp. 268, 272 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
319. Id. at 272.
320. See, e.g., Press Publ’g Co. v. McDonald, 63 F. 238, 241 (2d Cir. 1894) (noting that, in a
libel case, courts have “‘no right to be ignorant of the meaning of current phrases which
everybody else understands’” (quoting Bailey v. Kalamazoo Publ’g Co., 40 Mich. 251, 256
(1879))); Marc B. Hernandez, Note, Guilt Without Mens Rea: How Florida’s Elimination of
Mens Rea for Drug Possession Is Constitutional, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1697, 1712 (2014) (“[T]here
is no ‘right to be ignorant of the nature of the property in one’s possession’” (quoting State v.
Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 421 (Fla. 2012))). But see Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age of
Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 479, 492 (2012) (“Congress has a right to be ignorant . . . .”).
321. See Robert Batey, Mens Rea and Constitutional Law: A Report Card for the Florida
Supreme Court in State v. Adkins, 43 STETSON L. REV. 3, 7–8 (2013); Hernandez, supra note
320, at 1709.
322. See supra Part II.A.2 & note 231.
323. See supra Parts I.C.1 & II.A.
324. See generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 368–70 (1985).
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formation and informed consent (just to name a few) are hollow and superfluous:
contracting parties have no meeting of the minds, and informed consent is giving
consent without being informed. States could continue to freely mandate ultrasounds
for pregnant women against their wills as though their attentions were not really
theirs in the first place. Similarly, other problems in our daily lives that involve
attention would likely continue to go unaddressed.
This Article proposes legislation to recognize the right to attention as a statutory
right, or alternatively, suggests that the courts recognize the right to attention as a
common law right based on the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the right to
attention’s much larger, as-yet-poorly-defined bundle of rights includes, for example,
the right to deny attention when demanded, the right to be left alone, the right to not
be spammed and the right not to receive ads when such advertisement is unwanted
or uninvited, the right to waive the understanding of an agreement, the right to give
consent without being informed, and the right not to be required to receive
information against one’s will.
This Article is the first to identify the right to attention, including its much larger,
as-yet-poorly-defined bundle of rights. What this Article discusses—marketing,
mandatory ultrasounds, informed consent, and contract formation—is in no way
comprehensive of the right to attention’s practical implications. Like the right to
privacy, the right to attention reaches far and wide. This Article invites further
discussion to fully flesh out this novel body of law.

